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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LAWRENCE O'NEIL 
SMITH, Appellant. 
[1] Poisone-IDegal P088e88ion of Narcotics-Evidence.-Wbere 
police officers, on obtaining information that defendant, a 
known narcotic addict, had just purchased a "spoonful of 
heroin" and that it would be on his person at a certain resi-
dence, went.to that residence, identified themselves, and, after 
being admitted, entered a bedroom, saw defendant move hits 
hand to his mouth and told him to "Spit it out," which he did, 
emitting a package containing heroin, and where defendant 
claimed that he was choked by one of the officers but there 
was testimony to the contrary by one of the officers, the trial 
court did not err in believing the officer's testimony. 
[I] Arrest-Withont Warrant-Bea.aonable Oause.-Reasouable 
cause to justify an arrest may consitst of information obtained 
from others and is not limited to evidence that would be ad-
missible at the trial on the issue of guilt. 
[3] Id.-Without Warrant-lLeasonable Oanae.-Where police of-
flcers had reasonable grounds to rely on an informer's report 
that defendant, a known drug addict, had just purchased 
heroin and that he could be found with it at the place where 
he was arrested, they were justified in arresting him. 
[4] Indictment and Information-Proof and Variance-Time.-
There was no fatal variance between an information alleging 
that the date of the offense charged was April 8th and proof 
that the date was March 8th, where defendant was not misled 
in making his defense in view of the fact that he knew from 
testimony given at the preliminary hearing that the date of 
the alleged offense was Karch 8th and that hits own witne88es 
testified to events on that date. 
{5] Criminal La'W-Plea--J'eopardy-Evidence.-On a plea of dou-
ble jeopardy, extrinsic evidence its admissible on the trial to 
identify the crime of which defen~ant was convicted. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Drugs and'Druggists, '47; Am.Jur., Evi-
dence, § 393 et seq. 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Arrest, ,10 et seq.; Am.Jur .. Arrest, ,48 
et seq. 
[4] See Oal.Jur.ld, Indictment and Information, § 95; Am.Jur., 
Indictment and Information, § 181. 
MeR. Dig. lLeferences: [1] Poisons, § 15; [2, 3] Arrest, 112; 
[4] Indictment and Information, § 111(3); [5] Criminal Law, 
§ 198. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. H. Burton Noble, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgment of 
conviction affirmed. 
Lawrence O'Neil Smith, in pro. per., and Ward Sullivan, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The trial court sitting without a jury, 
found defendant guilty of a felony violation of section 11500 
of the Health and Safety Code. It also found that he was 
previously convicted of narcotic addiction (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11721), a misdemeanor, and sentenced him to im-
prisonment in the state prison for a term prescribed by law. 
(See Health & Saf. Code, § 11712.) Defendant appeals. 
[1] A police officer of the Los Angeles Police Department, 
on the day before the arrest, received information from an 
informer that defendant had just purchased a "spoonful of 
heroin" and that it would be on his person at a certain resi-
dence. The officer knew that defendant was a narcotic addict. 
On the day of the arrest, two officers approached the house in 
question and through a window observed defendant and a 
woman sitting on a bed, but saw nothing incriminating. They 
went to the front door and knocked. An elderly lady opened 
the door. The officers identified themselves,· entered, and 
walked toward the room where they had seen defendant. One 
of the officers testified that the elderly lady then shouted, 
"Lawrence, the police are here." The bedroom door was 
closed, but the officers did not know if it was locked. De-
fendant's witnesses testified that the door was locked. When 
the officers entered the bedroom, they saw defendant move 
his hand to his mouth and told him to "Spit it out." There 
is a conflict in the testimony as to whether defendant was 
choked by one of the officers. Defendant spat out a packa~e 
containing five rubber balloons later shown to contain heroin. 
He admitted that the package was his and that he attempted 
to swallow it when he heard the police at the door. The officers 
then arrested him. The package containing the heroin was 
introduced in evidence at the preliminary hearing. 
At the trial the transcript of the preliminary hearing was 
introduced in evidence. Defendant'8 motion to suppress the 
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evidence on the ground that it had been obtained in violation 
of the rules stated in Rockin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 
S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 13961 and People v. 
Martinez, 130 Cal.App.2d 54 [278 P.2d 261, was denied In 
those cases the conduct condemned was brutal force, "con-
duct that shocks the conscience." In the Martinez case the 
court said: "It is clear that the substance was choked out of 
Martinez. The fact that the officers and Martinez were thrown 
to the ground indicates the extent of the force that was 
deemed necessary and that sufficient force was used to accom-
plish that purpose." (130 CalApp.2d54, 56.) Although 
defendant's testimony would tend to show that the officer 
choked. him, there was testimony to- the contrary by one of 
the arresting officers. We cannot hold that the trial court 
erred in believing the officer's testimony. 
The officers had no search warrant and, apparently, 
no warrant for defendant's arrest. Thus, the lawfulness of 
the arrest turns on the question whether the officers had 
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed 
a felony. (People v. Boyles, 45 Ca12d 652,655-656 [290 P.2d 
535].) 
[2] Reasonable cause to justify an arrest may consist of in-
formation obtained from others and is not limited to evidence 
thai would be admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt. 
(People v. Boyles, supra; Wmson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 
2d 291,294 [294 P.2d 36].) [3] If the officers had reasonable 
grounds to rely on the informer's report that defendant had 
just purchased heroin and that he could be found with it, at 
the place where he was arrested, they were justified in arrest-
ing him. (Willson v. Superior Court, supra.) The record 
supports the trial court's conclusion that the officer's past 
experience with the informer,· together with their knowledge 
that defendant was a drug addict, gave the officers reasonable 
cause to believe that defendant h,ad committed a felony. More-
*One of the arresting officers telrtified: 
"A. I have been tbere when he [tbe informant] bas given us approxi-
mately su otber bits of information and about three of tbem have 
been--on three of them we have made arrests and the otber three we 
just hit it too late. 
"Q. Well, in those three bits of information where you made arrests, 
tbose have been narcotic cases; is that correct! A. Yes: 
• • Q. And when you would go out to where he would tell you to go did 
you find any narcotics? A. Yes. 
"TuIII CoUll'l'1 In other words, this infarmer is a reliable informer' 
"TB1\ WI'l'NUS: Very reliable." 
( 
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over, at the trial defendant made no attempt to determine the 
identity of the informer or to question his reliability. 
[4] In his brief in propria persona, filed before the appoint-
ment of counsel, defendant contends, that there was a fatal 
variance between the date of the offense charged in the in- I 
formation, April 8, 1956, and the date of the offense proved, 
March 8, 1956. In People v. LaMarr, 20 Cal.2d 705, 
711 [128 P.2d 845), this court stated: "An immaterial vari-
ance should be disregarded. (14 Cal.Jur. 96; People v. Mizer, 
(1940),87 Cal.App.2d 148, 158-154 [99 P.2d 883).) The test 
of the materiality of a variance is whether the indictment 
or information so fully and correctly informs the defendant 
of the criminal act with which he is charged that, taking into 
consideration the proof which is introduced against him, he 
is not misled in making his defense, or placed in danger of 
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." De-
fendant was not misled in making his defense, for he knew 
from the testimony given at the preliminary hearing that the 
date of the alleged offense was March 8, 1956, and his own 
witnesses testified to events on that date. [6] Nor is he in 
danger of being placed in double jeopardy, for it is "well 
settled that on a plea of double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence 
is admissible on the trial to identify the crime of which a 
defendant has been convicted." (People v. Williams, 27 
Cal.2d 220,226 [163 P.2d 692).) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
